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SHARPENING THE DIALOGUE
DEBATE: THE NEXT DECADE OF
SCHOLARSHIP©
KENT ROACH*
The first part of this commentary examines the roles of
coordinate construction in which legislatures act on
their own interpretation of the constitution, second
look cases in which the courts judge the
constitutionality of a legislative reply to a judicial
decision, and various constitutional remedies. The
second part examines some differences in emphasis
between the author's approach to dialogue and that
taken by Hogg and his co-authors with respect to the
justification of the judicial role in the dialogue, the
relation between Charter dialogue and common law
constitutionalism, and the proper interpretive
approach to section 7 of the Charter. Three areas that
may be a productive focus for the next decade of
scholarship about institutional dialogue are outlined.
They involve comparative studies, dialogue in the post-
9/11 environment and increased study of the legislative
role in dialogue.
La premiere partie de cc commentaire examine les
r6les d'interpr6tation coordonn6e, oti les 16gislatures
agissent selon leur propre interpr6tation de la
Constitution, et rel~guent au deuxi~me plan les
affaires oil les tribunaux jugent la constitutionnalit6
d'une rdponse 1dgislative A une d6cision judiciaire et
divers recours constitutionnels. La deuxi~me partie
examine certaines difffrences d'intensit6 entre la faqon
dont rauteur aborde le dialogue, et celle qu'adoptent
Hogg et ses co-auteurs concernant la justification du
r6le judiciaire du dialogue, la relation entre le dialogue
sur la Charte et le constitutionnalisme de la common
law, et l'approche interpr6tive adequate de la Partie 7
de la Charte. On souligne trois domaines, qui peuvent
constituer un point d'int6ret productif pour les 6rudits
de la prochaine d6cennie au sujet du dialogue
institutionnel. Y figurent les 6tudes comparatives, le
dialogue dans le monde suivant les attentats du 11
Septembre, et une 6tude amplifife du r6le 16gislatif
dans le dialogue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Peter Hogg and his co-authors, Allison A. Bushell Thornton and
Wade K. Wright, are to be congratulated for their careful review of the
multi-faceted debate that has surrounded the concept of dialogue in
Canada over the last decade. This debate was in large part sparked by
their tremendously influential 1997 article in this journal.' Now this new
article2 demonstrates that the idea of institutional dialogue between
courts and legislatures will continue to be debated, reshaped, and
challenged for some time to come. Although the effects of this new
article on courts and legislatures remains to be seen, I am confident that
it will play an important role in the continuing academic debates about
dialogue occurring in Canada and abroad.
In the first part of this short commentary, I will outline some
areas where I agree with the authors. This part will reflect on some
important debates that already exist about the role of coordinate
construction, in which legislatures act on their interpretations of the
constitution even when they differ from judicial interpretations; second
look cases, in which the courts examine the constitutionality of a
legislative reply to a judicial decision; and whether constitutional
remedies should be crafted to facilitate dialogue between courts and
legislatures. In the next part, I will examine a few areas where there are
differences of emphasis that may distinguish my approach to dialogue
from that taken by the authors. The differences of emphasis are about
what justifies the judicial role in the dialogue, the relation between
Charter dialogue and common law constitutionalism, and the proper
Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [" CharterDialogue"].
2 Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue
Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors"' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 [" Charter Dialogue
Revisited"].
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interpretive approach to section 7 of the Charter In the last part of this
commentary, I will outline some areas that may be a productive focus
for the next decade of scholarship about institutional dialogue. If
dialogue scholarship is to continue to thrive over the next decade, it may
benefit from more comparative studies, study of the implications of
dialogue in the post-September 11 (9/11) environment, and increased
study of the legislative role in dialogue.
II. THREE AREAS OF AGREEMENT
A. Sharpening the Debate About Coordinate Construction
Much of the recent academic debate about dialogue involves
disputes over the degree to which the legislature should be able to act
on its own interpretations of the Charter. In Canada, a number of
prominent political scientists have argued against privileging judicial
interpretations of the Charter over legislative interpretations.3 In the
United States, a number of commentators have defended the idea that
legislatures can act on their own interpretation of the constitution,
especially when the legislature is engaged in a reasonable disagreement
with the Court.4 In R. v. Mills,5 the Supreme Court also seemed to
concede some ground to coordinate construction when, while deferring
to a legislative reversal of its prior decision on production and disclosure
of confidential records in sexual assault cases, it stated: "Courts do not
hold a. monopoly on the protection and promotion of rights and
freedoms; Parliament also plays a role in this regard and is often able to
act as a significant ally for vulnerable groups."6 Set against this
enthusiasm for coordinate construction are reservations expressed by a
number of commentators, including myself, about the legislature acting
3 Christopher Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter Canada and the Paradox of
Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001); Janet L. Hiebert,
Charter Conflicts. What Is Parliament's Role?(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002);
and James B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers'
Intent (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).
' Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999); Jeremy Waldron, Law andDisagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999); and Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves. Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
s[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at 711-12.
6 Ibid.
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on its interpretation of the constitution when it conflicts with the Court's
interpretation,7 and the reservations expressed by the authors in their
new article.
My concern about coordinate construction is that the legislature
as an elected institution has an incentive to minimize and even trivialize
the rights of the truly unpopular. Although the Supreme Court may be
right in Mills that the legislature can be "a significant ally" for some
vulnerable people, such as crime victims and women and children who
are potential victims of sexual violence, I doubt that the legislature will
be inclined to stand up for the rights of the truly unpopular such as
those accused of crime, suspected terrorists, and prisoners. I am
concerned not only that legislatures may devalue the rights of the
accused and other unpopular groups, but also that they may avoid some
of the tough questions that courts should ask when assessing whether a
limit on a right is demonstrably justified and proportionate. For
example, legislative preambles often focus on laudable objectives for
limiting rights, but not on tougher questions such as whether the
legislation is rationally connected with those objectives or why less
restrictive means were rejected.' The House of Lords's first Belmarsh
case' is an excellent example of how judges can apply a disciplined form
of proportionality analysis-one that is sensitive to the equality and
other rights of the unpopular-in a manner that seems to be difficult for
elected, legislatures to accomplish.
In "Charter Dialogue Revisited," the authors articulate a
position on coordinate construction with which I wholeheartedly agree.
Drawing on the work of Professor Brian Slattery,1" they make a useful
distinction between the relatively unproblematic11 first order obligation
7 Jamie Cameron, "Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R. v.
Mi? (2001) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 1051; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial. Judicial Activism or
Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001); and Carissima Mathen, "Constitutional
Dialogue in Canada and the United States" (2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 403.
8 Kent Roach, "The Uses and Audiences of Preambles in Legislation" (2001) 47 McGill
L.J. 129.
9 A. v. Secretary of State, [2005] 3 All E.R. 169.
'0 Brian Slattery, "A Theory of the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 701.
" There are important issues about who is responsible for Charter-vetting within
government. At present, reliance is placed on the Attorney General, who at the federal level has
never reported that a government bill is inconsistent with the Charter and who conducts Charter
vetting in private shielded by solicitor-client privilege and Cabinet confidentiality. Other methods
of Chartervetting include the use of legislative committees with a mandate to ensure that proposed
[VOL. 45, NO. I
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of the legislature, to rely on its own interpretation of the Charter when
drafting legislation, and the much more problematic second order issue
of whether the legislature can ignore or disagree with a judicial decision
of the Supreme Court when drafting legislation. With respect to this
second order issue, they suggest that the legislature should only act on
its interpretation of the constitution when it is prepared to use the
override or to present new evidence to the Court that will change its
section 1 analysis. I agree. A legislature prepared to act in defiance of
even a 5:4 decision of the Supreme Court should take responsibility for
using the override. Anything less can threaten respect for the courts and
the rule of law and encourage legislatures to casually override judicial
decisions defending the rights of the unpopular. I also agree that a new
section 1 defence, as opposed to the use of the override, would be
sufficient if the government has made a genuine and good faith effort
either to introduce new section 1 evidence or to argue a different
objective for limiting rights as interpreted by the Court. In some cases,
respect for the Court should require the legislature to refer such draft
legislation for a judicial decision about its constitutionality.12
I also agree with the authors that, given traditional
understandings of judicial review and the rule of law, the onus should be
on the proponents of coordinate construction to demonstrate why
legislatures should be able to act on interpretations of the constitution
that differ from those provided by the courts. Although legislatures hold
hearings before enacting legislation, the rules of the game are quite
different from those that apply in court. No one is guaranteed an
audience before the legislature and no one has a right to a reasoned
decision from the legislature. If you do not represent an interest that is
relevant to the governing coalition, you can safely be ignored.
Sometimes you will be shouted down or ridiculed. I think it is
particularly incumbent upon defenders of coordinate construction to
demonstrate how the truly unpopular will fare in their promised land,
where constitutional decisions of courts can be cast aside by a majority
vote in the legislature.
legislation is consistent with the Charter, and perhaps to engage in coordinate construction, in
which the legislature articulates its own interpretation of the Charter. See generally Hiebert, supra
note 3.
12 Kent Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of
the Rule of Law " (2006) 31 Queen's L.J. 598 at 635-37.
20071
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Disagreements about coordinate construction are important and
genuine and are likely to continue for some time. Although some
proponents of coordinate construction seem to oppose judicial review by
courts, others, especially the Canadian proponents, do not. It is also not
clear that the well-established American debate about coordinate
construction can simply be transferred to the Canadian context with its
different system of government and political culture. Although Hogg
and myself are both suspicious of coordinate construction that defies a
Supreme Court ruling, we both accept that legislatures do, in the first
instance, act on their views about what is permissible under the Charter,
and that they can legitimately challenge judicial decisions, either by
introducing new section 1 evidence and arguments or by using the
override. At one level, scholarly disagreements about coordinate
construction are an intramural debate among those who accept dialogue
but differ about the role of courts and legislatures in that dialogue. At
the same time, however, debates about coordinate construction may also
be a form of shadow boxing over judicial review in general.
B. The Proper Approach to Second Look Cases
Hogg and his co-authors rightly point out that second look cases
in which the Supreme Court determines the constitutionality of a
legislative reply raise some of the most difficult issues with respect to
dialogue. They accurately describe the inconsistent approach that the
Court has taken in a variety of second look cases.13 After acknowledging
that he originally advocated a more deferential approach to second look
cases,14 Hogg, and his co-authors, conclude that the appropriate
approach in a second look case is simply to determine whether the new
legislation has been demonstrably justified as a limitation on Charter
rights. At the same time, they acknowledge that reply legislation will
often be drafted with 'the Court's decision in mind and is "likely to yield
a particularly strong case for section 1 justification." 5 I agree that the
13 Indeed, the cases cover a spectrum, with the deference of Harper v. Canada, [2004] 1
S.C.R. 827 at one end and the activism of Sauv6 v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Sauv6]at the other,
with R. v. Ha/, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 in between because of the Court's partial invalidation of the
reply legislation.
" Peter W. Hogg, "Discovering Dialogue" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 3 at 5 [Hogg,
"Discovering Dialogue"].
' Supra note 2 at 49.
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Court should approach second look cases straight up wiihout a
predisposition to either validation or invalidation, but I am a bit less
optimistic about whether reply legislation will address all the
components of a section 1 analysis. 6 In any event, the judicial focus
should be on whether the legislation is justified and not on the
institutional interaction between the Court and the legislature. The
Court should not shy away from invalidation of reply legislation in
appropriate cases. I do not think courts should be concerned about
provoking consideration or use of the section 33 override. Section 33 is a
legitimate part of the Charter and part of its dialogic structure. 7 Judges
should decide cases as they see them and let the chips fall where they
may.
The authors indicate that they do not agree on the result in
Mills, and that the Court's decision in that second look case to uphold
Parliament's aggressive legislative reply is the "most difficult to
rationalize." 8 This may be in part because the Court in Mills seemed to
accept that the legislature could act on a different interpretation of
Charter rights from that provided by the Court, and in part because the
Court did not require the government to justify the new legislation
under section 1 of the Charter. Instead, the Court took a reconciliation.
of rights approach, which runs the risk of placing the burden of
justification on the accused and allowing the accused's rights, to be
diminished without acknowledging that this is being done. It would have
been helpful to know more about how the authors approach Mills. As
with coordinate. construction, how courts will approach second look
cases involves not only understandings of dialogue, but also approaches
161 agree with the authors that the Court's eventual decision on the constitutionality of the
in-your-face reply to R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 will be an important opportunity for the
Court to clarify its approach in second look cases. The government will defend the legislatioh under
section 1 and with reference to the legislative preamble, but the preamble does not address the
crucial section 1 question of whether there was a less drastic means of protecting the public from
drunken offenders than taking away the extreme intoxication defence to crimes of general intent.
See Kent Roach, "Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in
Canada and the United States" (2006) 4 Int'l J. Const. L. 347.
17 For an argument that the Ontario Court of Appeal should have used a delayed
declaration of invalidity in its same-sex marriage case, see Kent Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review
and its Critics" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 49 at 81-89 [Roach, "Critics"]. It is interesting that
the one case in which the Supreme Court struck down a legislative reply in a second look case
involved one of the few Charter rights that was not subject to the override. See Sauve, supra note
13, striking down reply legislation restricting prisoners' right to vote.
" Supra note 2 at 50.
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to judicial decision making and judicial review. The next decade of
constitutional scholarship may focus more on the substance of judicial
and legislative decision making within a realistic framework that
recognizes the dialogue between the two institutions.
C. Remedies as Instruments of Dialogue
I agree with Hogg and his co-authors that the crafting of
constitutional remedies is an important site of dialogue between courts
and legislatures. I also agree with their defence of suspended
declarations of invalidity as an instrument of dialogue and take comfort
in the fact that this Canadian innovation has subsequently been
endorsed in section 172 of the South African Constitution.19 I have long
argued that the Schachter v. CanadaW° guidelines are too restrictive in
pigeonholing suspended declarations of invalidity and eschewing
considerations of relative institutional competence. At the same time,
however, I have also argued that courts need to be attentive to the
position of the successful litigant either by exempting that person from
the period of delay or awarding costs. 21 I also believe that courts should
encourage legislatures to consider the position of all those who may be
adversely affected by suspended remedies.
22
Suspended declarations are a valuable instrument of dialogue
because they give the legislature an opportunity to expand the terms of
debate and enact more comprehensive and creative remedies than the
court's restricted remedy of invalidity. I am not convinced by arguments
that they are an illegitimate incursion on rights protection 23 simply
because the court postpones for six to eighteen months rather than
indefinitely defers the remedy of a declaration of invalidity. If the
debate about coordinate construction separates Hogg and his co-authors
from those who are more suspicious of courts than they are, the debate
" Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996.
20 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [Schachteij.
21 Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora, ON: Canada Law
Book, 2006); Kent Roach, "Remedial Consensus and Dialogue" (2002) 35 U.B.C.L. Rev. 211.
22 Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, "Putting the Past Behind Us?: Prospective Judicial and
Legislative Constitutional Remedies" (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 205.
1 Bruce Ryder, "Suspending the Charter" (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 267; Lorraine
Weinrib, "Suspended invalidity orders out of sync with Constitution" Law Times (14 August 2006), online:
<http://www.lawtimesnews.comlindex.php?option =comcontent&task=view&id = 716&Itemid =82>.
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about suspended declarations of invalidity may separate them from
those who have greater faith in the courts than they do. If so, an
interesting feature of dialogue theory is that it may occupy the middle
ground between those who are suspicious of courts and rights protection
and those who are passionate defenders of courts and rights protection.
Dialogue theory is criticized both for defending judicial review and for
allowing the legislature to override rights. There is often much wisdom
in middle-ground or halfway-house positions. Alas, however, you can
end up being shot at by both sides!
The authors note that Justice Iacobucci has invoked the notion
of dialogue as a reason not to engage in creative interpretive remedies
that could deprive the state of the ability to justify a limit on a Charter
right under section 1 or to come up with new statutory regimes.24 They
argue that both the idea of dialogue and the related institutional
division of responsibility between the court and the legislature favouri
the use of a suspended declaration of invalidity that will allow the
legislature to consider the full range of its reply options under sections 1
and 33 of the Charter. I agree and would only add that there is
democratic value in allowing the legislature to go back to the drawing
board and rethink issues, such as child pornography and the permissible
discipline of children, with the assistance of the Court's decisions.
Creative interpretive remedies will often mean that the Court's
decisions will not face the full brunt of public and legislative
consideration, or what I have called democratic dialogue. The Court's
recent reliance on interpretive remedies and its failure to revisit the
restrictive Schachter guidelines, however, may suggest that its attraction
to dialogue theory may be diminishing.
III. THREE DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS
A. If Dialogue Does Not Justify Judicial Review, What Does?
The authors concede in their new article that understanding
judicial review as a form of dialogue does not in itself justify judicial
review. This accords with a concession that I made to the same effect in
'4 Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559.
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2004.' In my 2001 book, The Supreme Court on Tria. Judicial Activism
or Democratic Dialogue, I devoted a chapter to the discussion of
conventional attempts to justify judicial review, namely, those based on
the intent of the framers, enforcing the rules of democracy, and moral
principles. I concluded that reasonable persons will disagree about these
justifications and that no theory of judicial review will generate reliably
right answers. To my mind, this supported the wisdom of giving
legislatures the options of both limiting and overriding rights as fallibly
interpreted by the courts. At the same time, however, I thought I had
made clear that judges need theories of judicial review, and that my own
preference was for a combination of John Hart Ely's concern about
minorities and Ronald Dworkin's concerns about moral principles on
the basis that "judicial concern with both the ground rules of democracy
and moral principles will allow judges to articulate the fullest range of
fundamental values that might otherwise be neglected by the legislature
or the bureaucrats."26 My combination of these principled rights-based
and minority protection rationales for judicial review and the situation
of them in the context of dialogues between courts, legislatures, and
society was hardly novel.2 7 Still, it did provide a normative and
substantive foundation for judicial review. I probably .should have
elaborated on these points to guard against subsequent claims that
dialogue theory was devoid of moral content.2" It is important to justify
judicial review, but situating judicial review in the context of
a Roach, "Critics," supra note 17 at 67-75. Writing in the same volume, Hogg conceded
that the original 1997 article "went too far" when it "claimed that we had answered the counter-
majoritarian objection to judicial review." Hogg, "Discovering Dialogue," supra note 14 at 4.
26 Roach, supra note 7 at 238.
2 Although his work is perhaps best known for his advocacy of the passive virtues (as a
dialogic device), Alexander Bickel's early defences of judicial review, including the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954)), focused on the judicial role
in protecting principles and unpopular minorities. For a modern, and in my view, underrated
attempt to apply these insights to the American Bill of Rights with a recognition that they could be
applied more easily in the more overtly dialogic context of the Canadian Charter, see Guido
Calabresi, 'Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork
Brennan Debate Avoids)" (1991) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80.
28 Keith Ewing, "Human Rights" in Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., The Oxford
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 298; Andrew Petter, "Twenty
Years of Charter Justification: From Liberalism to Dubious Dialogue" (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 187;
Allan C. Hutchinson, "Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada" (2004) 24 L.S. 275; and Luc
Tremblay, "The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures" (2005) 3 Int'l J. Const. L. 617.
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institutional dialogue can accommodate the fact that reasonable people
will disagree about the justifications and rationale for judicial review.
In their new article, Hogg and his co-authors devote a paragraph
to the moral, legal, and political justifications for judicial review.2 ' For
them, the moral justification lies in the need to take rights seriously, and
the legal and political justifications revolve around the decision to
entrench rights in the constitution. I expect that this paragraph may
attract some criticism and that opponents of dialogue theory will be
eager to move the debate back to the more familiar territory of the
contested and indeterminate rationales for judicial review. For my part,
I am somewhat uneasy with the great reliance that Hogg and his co-
authors, as well as the Supreme Court, place on the entrenchment of the
Charter as the main justification for judicial review. The Charter is, as
they suggest, not going to go away, but I think it is necessary to explain
the rationales for giving unelected courts greater powers.
I agree with the authors that the need to take rights seriously is
part of the rationale for judicial review,3° but there are also other
normative justifications that draw on comparisons between courts and
legislatures which are encouraged by both legal process thought and
dialogue theory. One such rationale is the need for judicial protection of
unpopular minorities that are vulnerable to discrimination from the
legislature and the executive. Here inspiration can be found in both
Alexander Bickel's and Ely's theories of judicial review.31 It is also very
relevant that most Charter litigation involves matters of criminal justice
and that the accused has few, if any, allies in the legislative process.
More generally, the courts have an ability to bring questions of principle
to the fore that might otherwise be ignored or finessed in a majoritarian
legislative process or a non-transparent executive process. Another
normative justification for the idea of democratic dialogue is the
2 9 Supra note 2 at 28.
3This phrase is, of course, based on Ronald Dworkin's contributions to legal theory. I have
argued elsewhere that dialogue theories of judicial review allow robust forms of judicial review such
as those espoused by Dworkin's ideal judge, Hercules, to be used "not because of confidence that
judges using them will always reach right answers that are consistent with democracy, but because
they encourage judges to inject considerations of moral principles and less restrictive alternatives
into democratic debates .....".Roach, supra note 7 at 236-37.
- Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
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desirability of giving individuals guaranteed procedural rights to engage
in adversarial challenge of the state's actions. Here inspiration can be
found in Lon Fuller's work." Justice Iacobucci had been the leading
proponent of the dialogue theory of judicial review on the Supreme
Court, and I have argued elsewhere that his work on the Court is best
understood as a principled defence of the rights of the accused and of
vulnerable minorities that is supported at various junctures by the work
of theorists such as Bickel, Fuller, and Ely.33
A more normative turn in dialogue theory may be justified, but I
think it would be a mistake to approach the normative questions without
consideration of the strengths and weakness of all the institutions
involved in government and how each institution serves and interacts
with individuals on the ground. The normative work can be sharpened
by studying our experience with the actual behaviour of courts,
legislatures, and executives. A dose of empirical realism could also assist
the normative debate about judicial review. Most Charter litigation is
not about the unelected Court taking on the elected legislature, but
rather is about citizens requiring the police and other unelected
members of the executive to justify their coercive actions.34 The
normative debate about judicial review should not be limited simply to
the question of what justifies the Court in striking down democratically
enacted laws, but also includes what justifies the Court in requiring the
executive to account for and justify its actions. This take on dialogue
theory merges into a broader discussion of common law
constitutionalism.
B. Dialogue and Common Law Constitutionalism
From the start of my work in this area, I have tried to relate
dialogue under the Charter to common law constitutionalism, as
manifested by the way courts have interpreted public laws in light of a
background heritage of rights.3 In my view, it is important to situate the
32 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Lon Fuller,
"The'Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353.
-" Kent Roach, "A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue: Justice lacobucci's
Substantive Approach to Dialogue" (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. [forthcoming].
-4 Kelly, supra note 3 at 15.
-s Kent Roach, "Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court
and Canadian Legislatures" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481.
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Charter in this common law context in order to counter extravagant
claims about the novelty of judicial power under the Charter, and to
show continuity with the traditions that underlie judicial review and the
Charter. The Charter adds more bricks to the common law protections
of the rule of law, but it is not fundamentally inconsistent with those
foundations. Building on the traditional clear statement requirements,
judges should require the legislature to prescribe clearly in law any
limits that it places on Charter rights. This will help ensure some
democratic debate about limits on rights and also limit executive
discretion.36 Once limits on rights are prescribed by law, those laws can
both alert the public and constrain the executive. Ultimately, the court
may have to determine whether the limits placed on Charter rights are
proportionate and demonstrably justified, but even those decisions will
not constitute the last word if the legislature is prepared to offer more
section 1 evidence or to use the override as the ultimate clear statement.
Integrating the insights of common law constitutionalism with
dialogue theory also helps illustrate that what is at stake under the
Charter is not simply the respective roles of courts and legislatures, but
also the role of the executive and the need for increased supervision of
the executive by both the judicial and legislative branches of
government. This is an insight that has become more important in the
post-9/11 world, where the executive has increased power and the
mechanisms of accountability have not caught up to the expanded state
powers.37 Dialogue theory should not in the future focus solely on courts
and legislatures, but should also examine the range of other bodies,
including auditors general, human rights commissions, privacy and
information commissions, complaints and audit bodies, and other review
bodies, that can enter into a dialogue with the executive.3" The concept
of dialogue is flexible enough that it can be applied not only to the work
36 Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, "Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion,
Constitutional Remedies and Democratic Accountability" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
7 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services
Canada, 2006), online: <http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm>; Commission of Inquiry into
the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the
RCMP's National Security.Activities (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada,
2006), online: <http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDec122006.pdf>.
I See David. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law. Legality in a Time of Emergency
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) c. 3 for a call for creative institutions that can
preserve the rule of law in times of emergency.
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of adjudicative bodies that have the power to make authoritative
decisions, but also to quasi-adjudicative bodies that mainly have powers
of moral suasion and can call on government to respond to their rulings
without necessarily being able to force governments to comply with their
rulings. Moreover, the dialogue concept may also be useful to
understanding some forms of international law that rely more on
persuasion than command.39 Relating dialogue theory under the Charter
and other similar bills of rights to common law constitutionalism raises
interesting questions about the dialogic character of many forms of law.
In any event, common law constitutionalism has not been abolished by
the Charter, and dialogue between courts and legislatures takes place
not only under the Charter but also in terms of the common law and
statutory interpretation decisions of the courts.
The reasons why the authors have not related their dialogue
theory to common law constitutionalism are speculative. One reason
may simply be that they have, understandably, limited their field to the
Charter.40 Another possibility, however, suggested by Hogg's strong
criticisms of judicial decisions that rely on unwritten constitutional
principles,41 may be concerns about the legitimacy of common law
constitutionalism, which also relies on unwritten principles and can at
times lead to judicial decisions that are at odds with the legislative text.
This again points to the need for dialogue theorists to examine their
theories of legitimate judging. Such debates about positivism and non-
positivism should also, however, be situated and grounded in the
dialogue between courts and legislatures that occurs not only under the
Charter, but with respect to. the common law and statutory
interpretation.
For a preliminary attempt to apply the concept of dialogue to human rights adjudication
under international and regional law, see Kent Roach, "Constitutional, Remedial, and
International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience" (2005) 40 Tex. Int'l L.J. 537.
' On dialogue under the division of powers, see Peter W. Hogg, "Canada: From Privy
Council to Supreme Court" in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ed., Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative
Study(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 55 at 101-02.
4' Hogg has commented that the enforcement of an unwritten constitutional principle as if
it was "an express term" of the constitution makes it "hard to avoid the conclusion that the
Constitution has been amended by judicial fiat in defiance of the procedure laid down by the
Constitution for its amendment": ibid. at 91.
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C. Passive Virtues, Constitutional Minimalism, Section 7 and
Chaoulli
Dialogue between courts and legislatures can be promoted even
in the absence of a full constitutional decision. Bickel urged American
courts to employ a broad array of passive virtues, including
presumptions of statutory intent, as a means to promote dialogue with
legislatures about whether they really meant to limit rights. 2 Drawing
on Bickel's sensitivity about the difficulties of unelected c6urts striking
down laws enacted by elected legislatures, Cass Sunstein has urged
courts to employ constitutional minimalism in order to maximize the
space for legislative debate and replies.43 In Canada, Patrick Monahan
has similarly defended constitutional minimalism as a means to
maximize'the space for dialogue between courts and legislatures." I
have argued, however, that the Charteis explicit dialogic features,
which distinguish it from the U.S. Bill of Rights-section 1, section 33,
and suspended declarations of invalidity-combined with the fusion of
executive and legislative power in the parliamentary system, all facilitate
robust dialogue without the need for the intermediate strategies of the
passive virtues and constitutional minimalism."a More recently, however,
I have revised my opposition to the intermediate strategies in the
context of the Court's apparent decision to read section 1 out of section
7 of the Charter 6 and, more particularly, in the context of the Court's
decision in Chaoulli
4 7
It would have been interesting for Hogg and his co-authors to
have discussed Chaoulli and its relation to dialogue. Presumably,
Chaoulliis not discussed because technically the Court did not render a
majority decision under the Canadian Charter; Justice Deschamps'
42 Supra note 31.
43 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Tim. Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
4 Patrick J. Monahan, "The Supreme Court in the 21st Century" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 374.
4 5Roach, supra note 7 at 147-54.
'Kent Roach, "Common Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures"
(2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 733. See also Ian Leigh, "Secret Proceedings in Canada" (1996) 34 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 113 at 161-63, criticizing unwillingness to reach section 1 in national security cases.
4 Kent Roach, "The Courts and Medicare: Too Much or Too Little Judicial Activism?" in
Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice. The Legal
Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 184.
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decisive judgment striking down Quebec's prohibition on private
insurance for health services covered by medicare was rendered only
under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.
Nevertheless, Chaoulh4 along with the same-sex marriage cases, is the
most controversial example of judicial activism over the last decade. So
it is somewhat artificial that proponents of dialogue would ignore this
case, especially since the Court used the dialogic strategy of suspending
its decision for a year to allow the legislature to craft a reply, and also
since some commentators have blamed dialogue theory for the
decision.48
The Chaoulli decision raises a host of issues for dialogue
between courts and legislatures. One is the effect of abstract facial
judicial review on judicial decisions and dialogue with the legislature.
The Court in Chaoulli refused to grapple with the complexities of any
particular waiting list for medical treatment. Instead, it seemed to rely
on dubious propositions that any delay could render restrictions on
private-sector health care unconstitutional and that increased use of
private health insurance would provide those on waiting lists with
effective remedies. A Court attracted either to the passive virtues or to
constitutional minimalism would not have decided the case. Moreover,
the case for such an approach may be stronger because of the Court's
early, and not always consistent, decisions to read section 1 out of
section 7. The controversy over Chaoullisuggests that dialogue theorists
cannot ignore the substance of the Court's decisions.
Chaoulli may not be the disaster for dialogue that some have
claimed it to be. The immediate damage of Chaoulli was mitigated by
the Court's dialogic decision to suspend the judgment for a twelve-
month period, even though such a decision was unprecedented and
could not be supported under the restrictive Schachter guidelines.
Quebec has responded to Chaoulli with legislation that expands the
dialogue by allowing private medical insurance contracts for only a few
specified services, and only if those services are provided in specialized
medical centres where only'those physicians who have opted out of the
public plan will practice.49 Whether the Quebec legislation, or proposals
4 Andrew Petter, "Wealthcare: The Politics of the Charter Revisited" in Flood, Roach &
Sossin, ibid., 116.
49 Bill 33, An Act to Amend the Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services and
Other Legislative Provisions, 2
"' Sess., 37th Leg., Quebec, 2006 (assented to 13 December 2006),
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elsewhere, will protect the integrity of the public system in the wake of
Chaoulli remains to be seen, but the decision does demonstrate that
legislative paralysis is not the necessary Canadian response to judicial
activism. Better administrative appeals and procedures could also
provide provinces with some effective responses to Chaoull~i5 The
Court's decision at least encourages governments to consider the cases
of those denied life-saving or pain-relieving treatments. The Chaoulli
story is not yet complete, in large part because of the role of dialogue
between courts and legislatures.
IV. THREE PROJECTS FOR THE NEXT DECADE OF
DIALOGUE SCHOLARSHIP
A. A Comparative Testing of the Convergence Thesis about Weak
and Strong Forms of Judicial Review
There is a rich laboratory of comparative law that can be used to
explore and test dialogue theory. Indeed, one of the most interesting
facets of dialogue scholarship in the last decade has been the influence
of Canadian scholarship in many countries, including the United Stdtes,
Israel, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.51 A
continuum can be drawn with the American Bill of Rights at one end of
the scale, as perhaps the strongest form of judicial review, and Australia
at the other end, as a country without a national bill of rights and one
that relies solely on common law constitutionalism and a few state bills
of rights created on an explicitly dialogic basis. The South African
Constitution, the Canadian Charter, the U.K. Human Rights Act, 1998,
S.Q. 2006, c. 43, online: Assemblfe nationale du Quebec <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/
37legislature2/projets-loi/publics/06-a033.pdf>.
"Caroline Pitfield & Colleen M. Flood, "Section 7 'Safety Valves': Appealing Wait Times
Within a One-Tier System" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 47, 477.
1 Aharon Barak, "A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy"
(2002) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16 at 133-36; Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006) at 236-40; T.R.S. Allan, "Constitutional Dialogue and the
Justification of Judicial Review" (2003) 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 563; Richard Clayton, "Judicial
Deference and 'Democratic Dialogue': The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human
Rights Act" [2004] P.L. 33; Leighton McDonald, "Rights, 'Dialogue' and Democratic Objections to
Judicial Review" (2004) 32 Fed. L. Rev. 1; Tom R. Hickman, "Constitutional Dialogue,
Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998" [2005] P.L. 306; and Christine Bateup,
"The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue"
(2006) 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1109.
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and the New Zealand Bill of Rights all fall in varying places in the
middle and provide much raw material for testing the hypothesis
advanced by Mark Tushnet that even weaker forms of judicial review
will often tend to gravitate towards stronger forms of judicial review. 2
The comparative approach should be joined with a case study
approach because the effects of judicial review are likely to be different
in different areas. In "Charter Dialogue Revisited," the authors refer to
cases such as Vriend v. Alberta as special cases. 3 Professors Morton and
Knopff have raised the intriguing possibility that judicial decisions may
have the greatest staying power in those cases where public opinion is
relatively polarized and evenly divided (abortion and same-sex marriage
being two prime examples). 4 This hypothesis could be tested across
jurisdictions in order to distinguish the contexts that are more likely to
produce a legislative reply from those less likely to do so. Dialogue
theory may have greater explanatory power in some contexts than in
others; comparative case studies may hold the key to better
understanding the dialogue between courts .and legislatures.
B. Dialogue in Times of Crisis: Empowering or Weakening?
One context that should be examined by students of dialogue is
the nature of dialogue between courts and legislatures in times of crisis
or perceived crisis. One hypothesis would be that judges who are
relieved of the burden of judicial finality and supremacy may be more
willing to stand up for rights during a crisis. At the same time, however,
legislatures may make the fullest use of their dialogic powers in times of
real or perceived crisis when they perceive that public safety, if not
national survival, is at stake. As a result, the post-9/11 security context
may be a particularly rich site for institutional dialogue.
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld55 and Rasul v. Bush,56 affirming the need for some due
process in the treatment of alleged enemy combatants and affirming the
Mark Tushnet, "Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World" (2003) 53 U.T.L.J. 89.
S3 Supra note 2 at 40.
4 F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2000) at 163-66.
-'542 U.S. 507 (2004).
56524 U.S. 466 (2004).
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habeas corpus jurisdiction of the courts over Guantanamo Bay
detainees, attracted both administrative and legislative replies in the
rules for the tribunals determining enemy combatant status57 and the
Detainee Treatment Act,58 which limits judicial review by way of habeas
corpus. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court's more recent decision
against existing military commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld59 received
a quick legislative reply in the form of the Military Commissions Act,6"
which again limits habeas corpus review and codifies rules in regards to
military commissions. These cases underline how even American courts
may want to use constitutional review as a means to prompt dialogue
with legislatures, but they also raise difficult questions about whether
non-final dialogic judicial review will be sufficiently robust to protect
rights and freedoms in times of crisis.
The British experience with post-9/11 legislation is also
interesting for students of dialogue. Shortly after 9/11, the U.K.
Parliament was prepared to enter into an explicit and temporary
derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights in order
to allow for the indeterminate detention of non-citizen terrorist suspects
who could not be deported because they would be tortured.6" Unlike
section 33 of the Canadian Charter, however, derogations under the
European Convention allowed fairly searching judicial review, which at
the end of 2004 produced a strong House of Lords' decision holding that
it was disproportionate and discriminatory to derogate from the rights of
non-citizens when the terrorist threat was so limited.62 Under the
Human Rights Act, 1998, the Blair government could have simply
ignored this finding, but it chose to repeal the derogating provisions and
introduce new. legislation providing for control orders that could be
applied to terrorist suspects, both citizens and non-citizens.63 Control
orders are now being challenged in a round of second look cases. The
-z For a critical review of these rules, see Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, "Miscarriages of
Justice in the War Against Terror" (2005) 109 Penn State L. Rev. 967 at 1015-32.
8 U.S., Bill, H.R. 1815, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 109th Cong., (enacted) amending
.28 U.S.C. § 2241.
59126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
60 Military Commissions Act of20O6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
61 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (U.K.), 2001, c. 24, Part IV.
62 Supra note 9.
6Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (U.K.), 2005, c. 2.
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British experience suggests that courts can play an important role in
requiring legislatures to justify harsh and discriminatory measures, even
when their decisions are not binding. Parliament's decision to repeal the
law could be seen as evidence to support the thesis that weak-form
judicial review will converge with strong-form judicial review, but the
robust legislative reply also cannot be ignored. Much of post-9/11 history
in the United States and the United Kingdom can be seen through the
lens of institutional dialogue.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada upheld investigative
hearings introduced in post-9/11 legislation from Charter challenges,' it
read in extended immunity provisions and open court presumptions that
likely would have made investigative hearings a less attractive option for
the police and may lead them to rely on other means to obtain
information from reluctant witnesses. These cases follow the pattern of
the Canadian Court relying on robust interpretive remedies that alter
legislation. Although the Supreme Court's investigative hearing cases
have not yet produced a legislative response,65 they likely will produce a
less transparent administrative one. One possible administrative
response is that the authorities will be less likely to use investigative
hearings because of the judicially expanded publicity and immunity
requirements, and they may use a range of alternative measures,
including rewards for informants or even the use of preventive or
regular arrests, as a means to facilitate the questioning of reluctant
witnesses or the increased use of electronic surveillance.66
Understanding the administrative responses to court decisions is
another new frontier for dialogue scholarship. One disturbing
hypothesis is that robust rights protection by the Court may only inspire
less transparent and perhaps harsher responses from the executive.
Quasi-judicial bodies such as human rights commissions, privacy
commissioners, and complaints bodies may have an important role to
play in ensuring that the executive is required to publicize and justify its
administrative responses to court decisions. Democratic dialogue is not
'Re Application unders. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; Re Vancouver
Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332.
' Parliament must, however, decide in early 2007 whether the -investigative hearing and
preventive arrest provisions will be renewed for another five years.
Another important administrative response was the decision for a time to abandon war
crimes prosecutions after R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 in favour of immigration law procedures.
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simply a matter for courts and legislatures, but should also involve the
executive and the quasi-judicial wing of the executive.
C. Legislative Reforms. Improving or Replacing Dialogue?
A final fertile area for dialogue scholarship will be to study how
various reforms to the electoral and legislative process may affect
dialogue between courts and legislatures. Dialogue theory can be seen
as part of the new legal process movement in legal scholarship that paid
increased scholarly attention to the legislature.67 Political scientists who
have contributed significantly to the debate about dialogue were by
definition always concerned with the legislature, but there is a need for
all students of dialogue to reflect on the way changes in electoral and
legislative structures may affect dialogue between courts and
legislatures.
One legislative reform, which has and will likely continue to
attract considerable interest, is the optimal method by which proposed
legislation should be vetted within the legislature and the executive to
determine its consistency with the Charter. At present, most of this
vetting is carried out by attorneys general departments. A variety of
concerns have been raised about this process, including arguments that
such departments are likely to follow court decisions interpreting the
constitution, as well as concerns about the transparency and
independence of the process.6" Another means of Charter vetting is to
use legislative committees, but, at present, most committees in Canada
do not have many resources. The evolution of Chartervetting within the
government may well influence the debates about coordinate
construction discussed in Part IIA, above, as well as the extent to which
courts will have to invalidate legislation. Although Hogg and his co-
authors find generally similar rates of legislative replies to decisions
striking down laws since and before 1997, a striking feature of their post-
1997 data set is that it is composed of slightly less than a third of the
cases striking down laws than were found in the original data set. The
reasons for this decline in judicial invalidation of statutes may involve
increased deference in the Supreme Court and the increased use of
67 Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds., The Least Examined Branch: The Role of
Legislatures in the Constitutional State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
6 Hiebert, supra note 3.
20071
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
interpretive remedies. But they are also consistent with Professor Kelly's
thesis that judicial invalidation will decline because laws enacted in the
Charter era will have been subject to Charter vetting before their
enactment."9 Dialogue scholarship should focus on the judicial and the
legislative sides of the conversation.
In The Supreme Court on Trial,7 I tried to argue that the
Canadian parliamentary system, along with sections 1 and 33 of the
Charter and suspended declarations of invalidity, should be seen as
structural features of the Canadian constitution that facilitate dialogue.
My point was that a committed Cabinet that can rely on party discipline
could generally ensure a quick legislative reply to Court decisions, and
that there were plenty of examples in the 1990s of such robust and quick
legislative replies. Tight party discipline and responsible government-
in which the executive and the legislature are fused-distinguish Canada
from the United States. In Canada, events such as the defeat of an
attempted legislative reply to R. v. Morgentaler7 1 in the Senate are
exceptional. Since that time, however, we have elected consecutive
minority governments. The major political parties have discussed
loosening party discipline, and plans to re-invigorate the Senate through
elections are building steam. At the provincial level, there is also
increased interest in fixed elections, referenda, and elements of
proportional representation. All of these developments have the
potential to alter the dialogic balance between courts and legislatures.
There may very well be good reasons for an elected Senate, looser party
discipline, or the greater diversity of parties that would be produced by
proportionate representation, but all of these developments may make it
more difficult to enact reply legislation and may increase the staying
power of the status quo created by a judicial decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Hogg and his co-authors are to be congratulated both for
provoking so much debate with their original article and for responding
to and enriching that debate in their follow-up piece. Not everyone will
agree with either their empirical conclusion, that dialogue lives on, or
69 Kelly, supra note 3.
' 0Roach, supra note 7.
7' [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
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their normative conclusion that dialogue should live on. As a pragmatic
middle-of-the-road position, dialogue theory will continue to be
attacked by advocates of both judicial and legislative supremacy. Some
will argue that dialogue gives the legislature too much room to limit
rights while others will argue that it gives the legislature too little room.
Hopefully, however, we can all agree that by providing alternatives to
judicial and legislative supremacy, dialogue theory has significantly
enriched debates about judicial review in Canada and abroad.

